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t  every  meeting  of  central  bankers, 
policy-makers  and  economists,  there 
seems to be agreement that creation of a 
‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of 
the euro. Yet, progress in building this union is 
painfully  slow.  The  Single  Supervisory 
Mechanism may not be ready before the middle 
of  next  year,  the  Single  Resolution  Mechanism 
may require a laborious change of the EU Treaty 
and  common  deposit  insurance  has  been 
postponed  into  the  indefinite  future.  What  is 
making the establishment of Banking Union so 
difficult  are  the  protracted  fights  over  which 
government will be the payer of last resort when 
banks fail because of bad loans made in the past. 
If we continue along the present line, it does not 
seem likely that we shall ever reach full Banking 
Union.  
Therefore,  we  need  to  learn  from  Copernicus 
who could not make sense of the movement of 
planets  as  long  as  he  assumed  that  the  sun 
moved around the earth. But everything fell into 
place  for  him,  when  he  assumed  the  opposite. 
So, instead of trying to move from common bank 
supervision  over  to  resolution  and  then  on  to 
deposit insurance, let’s go backwards and start 
with  deposit  insurance,  move  from  there  to 
resolution, and end with supervision. 
 
 
Step 1. A 100% reserve requirement for safe 
deposits 
We  start  by  defining  the  risk-free  asset  in  our 
financial  system:  This  is  the  asset  that  can  be 
converted into legal tender at face value at any 
time.  The  concept  of  legal  tender  is  very 
important  in  a  fiat  money  system,  in  which 
money  derives  its  value  from  government 
regulation or law, because it ensures that we can 
settle  debt  with  almost  worthless  paper  or 
electronic bits. In a fiat money system the only 
legal tender is by definition central bank money. 
Hence, an asset is risk-free if it can be converted 
into central bank money at any time. It is easy to 
see that only few assets would qualify as risk-
free. Most importantly, the debt of governments 
that do not control the issuance of legal tender, 
as is the case in EMU, or deposits of banks that 
are backed by credit to entities that also do not 
control the issuance of legal tender, are not risk-
free. All these assets are risky because the debtor 
may not be able to convert them into legal tender 
at any time and under any circumstance.  
Hence,  in  EMU,  where  governments  have  no 
access to the money printing press of the ECB, 
the  only  risk-free  asset  is  cash  issued  by  the 
central bank and deposits that are fully backed 
by central bank reserves with the central bank. 
From this follows that we need to establish safe 
bank deposits as deposits that are fully backed 
by banks’ holdings of central bank reserves. In 
other words, we can effectively insure deposits 
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by  introducing  a  100%  reserve  requirement  for 
this  type  of  deposits.  No  industry  or  state 
deposit insurance scheme is required. A simple 
100% reserve requirement is sufficient. 
But would a deposit insurance scheme based on 
a 100% reserve requirement be at all possible in 
our  present  system?  The  answer,  of  course,  is 
yes: To back ‘insured’ deposits earlier created by 
fractional reserve banking, banks could borrow 
central  bank  reserves  in  the  necessary  amount 
and keep them on deposit with the central bank. 
The cost of this instrument for the banks would 
be  determined  by  the  difference  between  the 
lending rate and the deposit rate for central bank 
money. The cost for the bank customer would be 
determined by the net cost of central bank funds 
for the banks and the banks’ operating costs for 
the  insured  deposits.  The  benefit  for  the 
customer  would  be  to  have  a  safe  asset  other 
than only central bank notes, and the ability to 
use  this  asset  to  make  non-cash  payments.  A 
quantitative limit for safe deposits would not be 
necessary  as  the  central  bank  could  adjust  the 
supply  of  reserves  to  the  demand  for  safe 
deposits. But the central bank could influence the 
demand  for  safe  deposits  by  changing  the 
variable costs, which are given by the difference 
between the cost of central bank reserves and the 
rate that the central bank pays on deposits.  
During an economic upswing, when the demand 
for safe deposits is weak, the central bank could 
narrow the difference between the lending and 
deposit rate and thus increase the attractiveness 
of  safe  deposits.  All  things  being  equal,  an 
increase in deposits fully backed by central bank 
reserves would of course reduce the credit and 
money  multiplier  and  militate  against  credit 
creation  by  the  banking  system  during  the 
upswing.  In  a  recession,  when  the  demand  for 
safe  deposits  is  high,  the  central  bank  could 
widen the corridor and make safe deposits more 
costly.  A  reduction  of  safe  deposits  relative  to 
other deposits would tend to raise the credit and 
money  multiplier.  Thus,  by  influencing  the 
demand  for  safe  deposits  relative  to  other 
deposits, the central bank would also influence 
credit  extension  by  the  banks.  In  the  present 
circumstances,  where  banks  are  reluctant  to 
extend credit and the demand for safe deposits is 
high,  the  central  bank  could  move  the  deposit 
rate into negative territory and charge banks and 
their customers for holding safe deposits.1 
Step 2. A hierarchy of loss-absorbing bank 
liabilities 
Once  we  have  established  reserve-backed 
deposits as safe assets, all other bank liabilities 
would of course be risky. We can now define a 
hierarchy of loss absorption in a bank resolution 
regime. The first loss would of course be borne 
by  the  equity  tranche  on  the  liability  side  of 
banks’  balance  sheets.  After  having  set  aside 
assets pledged to cover secured debt, the second 
and third losses would be borne by junior and 
senior unsecured bank debt. The fourth and last 
loss  would  accrue  to  deposits  uncovered  by 
central  bank  reserves.  When  all  bank  liabilities 
except  deposits  fully  covered  by  central  bank 
reserves  contribute  to  cover  losses  on  bank 
assets,  taxpayer-funded  bank  bailouts  would 
become  significantly  less  likely  (and  may 
eventually  become  unnecessary).  As  long  as 
banks  engage  in  maturity  transformation, 
liquidity crises remain possible and a lender-of-
last  resort  is  necessary.  However,  the  risk  of  a 
liquidity crisis could be reduced if the scope for 
maturity transformation would be limited in the 
regulatory  framework.  Moreover,  when  the 
public fully understands the risk associated with 
an exposure to banks beyond the reserve-backed 
safe deposit, it would be up to banks to reassure 
bank  equity  investors  and  creditors  that  their 
assets are being managed in a way that makes 
illiquidity and losses become unlikely. 
Step 3. Divest banks from governments by 
revised regulations for government debt 
To  be  able  to  fund  their  assets  at  reasonable 
costs, banks would need to have a comfortable 
equity  cushion  and  a  well  diversified  and 
reasonably  liquid  portfolio  of  assets.  Most 
importantly,  they  would  have  to  reduce  their 
exposure  to  government  debt  to  a  level 
consistent with this debt being subject to default 
risk.  Hence,  in  the  new  regulatory  regime, 
                                                   
1 Banks in Germany and certain other euro area countries 
today already hold large amounts of central bank reserves. 
However,  these  reserve  holdings  are  motivated  by  the 
banks’ reluctance to lend to other banks in other euro area 
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government  debt  would  have  to  be  backed  by 
equity at least in part (with the rest back by other 
loss-absorbing  bank  liabilities),  and  it  would 
have  to  be  subject  to  limits  for  single  credit 
exposure.  To  allow  banks’  divestment  from 
government  debt,  the  European  Central  Bank 
could buy in a one-off operation the government 
bonds  that  banks  have  pledged  to  the  central 
bank  as  collateral  for  obtaining  central  bank 
credit, and place them in a special account that 
will be wound down over time. 
As a result of this operation, risky claims of the 
banks  on  governments  would  be  replaced  by 
risk-free claims of the banks on the ECB or, in 
other words, by central bank reserves. The ECB 
would of course want to reduce its exposure to 
government debt over time.  
Since it is very doubtful that all highly indebted 
euro-area  countries  could  repay  their  debt, 
governments  and  the  ECB  could  agree  that  all 
income from seigniorage would be used to pay 
down the government debt held by the ECB in 
the special account. Since the present discounted 
value of seigniorage can be very large, reaching 
several trillion euros in the case of the euro area, 
depending  on  interest  rates  on  central  bank 
credit  and  the  growth  rate  of  non-interest-
bearing central bank money, it seems likely that 
this would be sufficient to eventually retire the 
government debt acquired by the ECB from the 
banks. Moreover, since a significant part of the 
government  bonds  acquired  by  the  ECB  from 
banks  would  have  fairly  short  maturities,  the 
position of the ECB could be reduced by simply 
letting the bonds run down.  
The  arrangement  outlined  here  has  some 
resemblance  to  the  debt  redemption  fund 
proposed  by  the  German  Council  of  Economic 
Experts.  However,  an  important  difference  is 
that in the arrangement above, the ECB would 
withhold  revenue  to  pay  down  the  debt  and 
would  not  have  to  rely  on  governments  to 
allocate revenue for this purpose. 
Part  of  the  reserves  obtained  by  selling 
government  bond  holdings  to  the  ECB  can  be 
used by the banks to back safe deposits. The rest 
can  be  released  by  the  ECB  into  the  banking 
system and the economy at large by setting a rate 
for central bank deposits below the risk-adjusted 
bank lending rates. With their debt now subject 
to  default  risk,  highly  indebted  governments 
may  have  difficulties  accessing  the  market  at 
reasonable costs to roll over expiring debt. But 
market  access  could  be  improved  if  the  ECB 
agreed to assume the status of a junior creditor 
for  the  government  bonds  they  have  acquired 
from banks in case of a debt restructuring. Like 
the orderly pay down of the debt, the costs for 
such a restructuring could be covered by future 
seigniorage  income.  This  would  represent  a 
partial mutualisation of public debt, but because 
of  its  limited  character  it  would  probably  be 
acceptable  for  countries  with  stronger  balance 
sheets. 
A more level playing field 
The  proposed  structure  for  Banking  Union 
would of course change the way in which banks 
operate  and  governments  fund  themselves. 
Banks would no longer extend credit and create 
book money at will; rather, they would assume 
the  dual  role  of  1)  safe  keeper  of  the  risk-free 
assets,  i.e.  central  bank  money,  for  depositor-
savers  and  2)  intermediary  of  funds  between 
investor-savers and entrepreneurs. 
It  is  possible  that  bank  lending  rates  would 
increase, but if they do, it would only be because 
savers realise that in a fractional reserve banking 
system  bank  deposits  carry  credit  risk,  unless 
they  are  fully  backed  by  banks’  holdings  of 
central  bank  reserves.  In  fact,  the  widespread 
notion that bank deposits in our present system 
of fractional reserve banking are completely safe 
and can be converted into central bank money at 
any  time  and  in  all  circumstances  represents  a 
subsidy to bank lending rates (and bank profits).  
Governments could no longer rely on banks to 
fund  their  debt  and  would  have  to  obtain 
funding  from  the  capital  markets.  Borrowing 
costs could also increase for them as they would 
no longer be regarded as offering risk-free assets 
and  could  no  longer  benefit  from  preferential 
treatment on banks’ balance sheets in the form of 
zero-risk  weighting  for  the  calculation  of 
regulatory  capital  requirements  and  exemption 
of single-credit exposure limits. Again, such an 
increase in borrowing costs would represent the 
end of a subsidy to government borrowing as a 
result of special regulatory treatment. 




To  sum  up,  Banking  Union  could  be  built  in 
three  steps.  In  the  first  step,  deposit  insurance 
could  be  introduced  in  the  euro  area  by 
requiring banks to fully back safe deposits with 
central  bank  reserves.  This  would  be  the  only 
safe  asset  in  EMU,  where,  as  already  noted, 
governments have no command over the money 
printing press of the central bank. All other bank 
liabilities would participate in covering losses on 
the  asset  side  of  banks’  balance  sheets  in  a 
hierarchical  order  established  by  the  common 
bank  resolution  regime  in  the  second  step.  To 
help banks divest from government bonds, the 
ECB could buy these bonds from them, replacing 
risky  claims  of  banks  on  governments  by  risk-
free claims of banks on the ECB in the third step. 
Governments  and  the  ECB  could  agree  to  use 
future  seigniorage  income  to  pay  down  the 
government debt held by the ECB.  
 
 
Appendix 1. The Copernican turn for Banking Union 
Present approach  Proposed approach 
Step 1 
Establish SSM on the basis of the regulatory 
framework mapped out in CRDIV. 
Step 1 
Establish deposit insurance by requiring safe 
deposits to be backed 100% by banks’ holding of 
reserves with the central bank. 
Step 2 
Establish SRM backed by a government-funded 
restructuring and resolution fund. 
Step 2 
Establish SRM with hierarchical loss absorption of 
all bank liabilities except safe deposits. Resolution 
fund would operate only in the transition to new 
regime, and then would no longer be required. 
Step 3 
Keep deposit insurance under national authority. 
Step 3 
Establish SSM on the basis of CRDIV, modified to 
introduce positive risk weights and single credit 
exposure limits for government debt. The ECB 
would help divest banks from government bonds 
and redeem the ECB’s acquired government bond 




Appendix 2. The structure of bank balance sheets in the new regime 
Assets  Liabilities 
                       Central bank reserves                                  Safe deposits 
                       Ring-fenced assets                                  Covered bonds 
                      Other assets                                  Investor deposits* 
                                Senior debt* 
                                Junior debt* 
                                Equity* 
* Participating in losses in ascending order. 
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